Exercising choice between a Presidential and a Parliamentary democracy for designing the constitution for a new democracy demands a keen identification of the short term and long-term aspirations for the country it is being designed for. That identification is particularly critical for a country with deep social divisions, ethnic or partisan, where stability and peace would be a precondition for democratic governance to exist and to thrive. In this essay, I argue for a Parliamentary Democracy on grounds of a longer expected life span, lower propensity towards military dictatorship and potential for stability in an ethnically divisive society.  I also explain why in a multiple-party system, I would choose a Parliamentary Democracy, whereas in a two-party system, I would favor a Presidential Democracy. 

The fives waves of independence experienced between the beginning of the nineteenth century and the breakup of the Soviet Union, show us that “there are no one set of factors that can account for the kind of constitutional framework that countries in each of these waves adopted” (Cheibub 136 -164). Those countries that inherited a functioning legislature, as was in the case of India and many other African and Caribbean countries under the British rule, adopted a parliamentary system whereas others that emerged out of colonialism without a strong head of state leaned towards a presidential constitution, Cheibub explains. 

As the conditions under which the new democracy has emerged is not clear, the state capacity of the institutions historically inherited by the country cannot be determined. It would therefore be appropriate to consider others factors like the expected life span of democracy. We know that “between 1946 to 2002, the expected life span of a Presidential democracy was 24 years as compared to 58 years for a Parliamentary Democracy” (Cheibub 136 -164), and while the level of economic growth, the size of the country and geographic location do influence the survival rates across democracies, they are not sufficient to establish causality. We also know that “the probability that democracy would die, falls more steadily as per capita increases under both Parliamentarianism and Presidentialism”, but according to Cheibub, “Presidential democracies are more likely to die at all income levels” (136 -164).

Given that the democracy for which a new constitution is being designed is ethnically diverse, it is critical to also observe the propensity of a certain regime type, to take to    military dictatorship, in a clash between majority and minority groups. As Alberto et al, point out, “ethnic diversity has costs and benefits” and refer to a large literature that finds a “negative impact of ethnolinguistic fragmentation on economic performance” (1). Given this, it is likely that the new democratic state, being ethnically diverse, also has high levels of inequality, and “countries where inequality is high will experience conflict and instability, which may lead to both militarism – which helps contain the escalation of conflict, and presidentialism – which allegedly provides for relatively strong leadership” (Cheibub 136 -164).  Furthermore, “military dictatorships tend to be followed by presidential systems”, Cheibub asserts, and irrespective of the institutional framework, “democracies following military dictatorships have shorter lives”. 

Deliberation on the kind of relationship expected between the executive and the legislature, and the incentives that relationship would present for conflict and cooperation will also influence the choice between presidential versus parliamentary form of governance for the new democracy. In a Presidential democracy, Nellis explains, the formal relationship between the executive and the legislative branches are separate, whereas, in a parliamentary system, they are fused. The two forms of institutional frameworks, determine the process of policymaking, barriers to governance and the likelihood of stability, but the type of party system the country follows can be fundamental in shaping governance outcomes (Nellis). In a Parliamentary form of governance, under a majority rule, the majority party controls the legislature and the executive which means getting support of the Parliament to pass policies is relatively easy. However, the trade-off is tremendous concentration of power in a single party, referred to as democratic dictatorship (Nellis). In a coalition government, concentration of power is considerably reduced as multiple parties form the cabinet. However, in this system, accountability becomes a challenge, as it is difficult to hold a single party accountable, and cooperation among different party members becomes key to the success of policy making and governance. In a Presidential system, power is dispersed between the legislature and the executive, and both branches are elected separately. “In a two-party system, a majority in guaranteed in the legislature; however, in a multi-party system, a majority is less likely to occur” (Nellis). It can thus be summarized that the distribution of party support in the legislature, the party discipline and polarization are consequential factors in the Presidential system to determine governance and policy outcomes.

Considering the above factors, and the socially divisive nature of the new democracy, it would be prudent to choose a Parliamentary form of governance, on grounds of a longer expected life span, reduced propensity towards military dictatorship, and a relatively stable government. However, the party system of the country, could fundamentally change outcomes. If the country has a two party system, and deep social divisions, then a majority government in a Parliamentary system is likely to lead to abuse of power through divisive identity politics, and heightened ease of passing policies without opposition. A Presidential democracy, will therefore be more effective in a two party system, where one party holds the legislature and the other, the executive, as the two opposing parties can constrain the abuses of power. If it is a multi-party system and a coalition government, then a parliamentary democracy would be preferable. I would therefore choose a Parliamentary democracy for a multi-party system but a Presidential democracy for a two-party system. 

The full essay with the works cited can be viewed below.