Most scholarly research remains focused on democracies and the risk of civil war. Through this paper, I study democratic institutions and their potential to win civil wars, arguing that democratic institutions imposing vertical constrains can win civil wars in the long term. Not only is it important to ascertain the regime type that is at the highest risk of civil war, but also to identify the democratic institutions that can be instrumental in enabling the state to win civil wars. Drawing from the case evidence of Sri Lanka, I find that democratic states that leverage electoral institutions and suffrage, and enforce vertical accountability, can win civil wars in the long term. I contend that strengthening both democratic institutions and institutional capacity is critical to defeating civil wars. 

The inverted U-shaped curve that pegs regime type to the probability of civil war has been widely accepted by conflict scholars, and finds that hybrid regimes are at most risk of civil war as their political institutions have characteristics that oscillate between autocracy and democracy (Piccone, 2017). This explains that political institutions are fundamental to civil peace, and further investigation may be deemed necessary to understand which institutional characteristics are not only most conducive for preventing civil wars but also winning civil wars.  This paper studies the case of Sri Lanka that won Asia’s longest civil war, to understand and ascertain the democratic institutions and characteristics that can increase the probability of the state to win civil wars. In identifying the institutional characteristics, I study the potential of democratic institutions that exert vertical constrains and vertical accountability on political leaders, and note their influence on civil war outcomes. I also draw out explanations for how democratic transitions in post conflict settings may be fundamental to stabilization.

This paper is divided into five sections: in the first section, I share scholarly research on democracy and civil war risks; in the second section, I present case evidence from Sri Lanka to explain LTTE’s formation and approach, and the state strategy that won the civil war; in the third section, I state my theory that democratic institutions imposing vertical constraints through elections and suffrage win civil wars in the long term; the fourth section discusses the theory with substantiated evidence; I conclude in the fifth section.